In a joint letter addressed to U.S. Senator Marco Rubio, the foreign ministers of Greece, Cyprus, and Israel have proposed reviving the dormant “3+1” cooperation framework with the United States, tying the request to the ambitious India-Middle East-Europe Economic Corridor (IMEC). While framed as a gesture of regional alignment with U.S. strategic priorities, the move raises questions about underlying motives, timing, and long-term viability—particularly given the mechanism’s lackluster record and the complex geopolitics of the Eastern Mediterranean.
Originally launched in 2019 in Jerusalem, the “3+1” format brought together Greece, Cyprus, Israel, and the United States to coordinate on energy and security matters. It was heralded at the time as a promising new architecture in the region, especially with then-Secretary of State Mike Pompeo’s participation in the trilateral summit alongside leaders Benjamin Netanyahu, Alexis Tsipras, and Nicos Anastasiades. Yet despite initial enthusiasm, the mechanism quickly lost momentum. Beyond a few working-level teleconferences and modest security discussions, tangible outcomes have been minimal, and the format has remained largely inactive for years.
The recent appeal for its reactivation appears closely tied to the IMEC initiative—an infrastructure and trade corridor designed to connect India with Europe via the Middle East, bypassing traditional routes through Turkey. The project, strongly supported by Washington, has been presented as a strategic alternative to China’s Belt and Road Initiative. Greece, Cyprus, and Israel, by aligning themselves with IMEC, are effectively positioning as regional partners in a venture that, while ambitious on paper, is still in early conceptual stages and faces numerous geopolitical and logistical hurdles.
ΔΙΑΒΑΣΤΕ ΕΠΙΣΗΣ
Framing this renewed cooperation as a support mechanism for IMEC invites skepticism. While the project indeed aligns with U.S. interest in curbing Chinese influence and strengthening ties with India, it also offers an opportunity for the three Eastern Mediterranean countries to promote their own agendas—chief among them, further sidelining Turkey. Ankara has long viewed the trilateral cooperation among Greece, Cyprus, and Israel with suspicion, and the absence of Turkey from the proposed corridor appears, to some, more intentional than incidental.
Moreover, this diplomatic maneuver comes at a time of renewed regional jockeying. The U.S. continues to encourage normalization between Israel and Arab states through the Abraham Accords, first signed in 2020. Former President Donald Trump, still influential in regional circles, has reportedly urged Syria’s transitional leadership to consider joining the accords, with Saudi Arabia quietly guiding this effort. Riyadh’s uneasy relationship with Ankara adds another layer of complexity, as Gulf states seek to assert their influence in regional diplomacy without ceding ground to Turkey.
While Israel has taken the lead in pushing for the revival of the “3+1” format, support in the U.S. is still tentative. A recent proposal in Congress—the Eastern Mediterranean Gateway Act—calls for enhanced cooperation with countries involved in the IMEC project, including Egypt, whose infrastructure assets are seen as critical. Yet it remains unclear how deep or sustained this congressional interest will be, especially in an election year and in the absence of concrete deliverables from past regional partnerships.
For all its strategic language, the renewed push to revive the “3+1” mechanism seems to serve multiple, and at times competing, interests. It may reflect a pragmatic desire to realign with U.S. priorities—but also a calculated effort to reassert regional influence and navigate around difficult neighbors. Whether Washington sees lasting value in this revived format, or views it as yet another diplomatic overture without clear outcomes, remains to be seen.
