Relations between Turkey and Israel have been in a prolonged state of deterioration. However, the existence of shared strategic interests—particularly regarding the security and stability of Syria—makes the possibility of a gradual normalization not only realistic but also desirable for third parties, especially the United States. Although a full rapprochement between Ankara and Tel Aviv seems difficult at present, the need to form a common framework for the post-Assad era could serve as a catalyst for reopening channels of communication.
This strategic outlook aligns with the regional objectives of both Turkey and Israel. Despite President Erdoğan’s inflammatory rhetoric and public support for Hamas, Ankara—like Israel—seeks to secure influence and control in Syria, aiming to counter Kurdish paramilitary structures and Shia militias, respectively. Moreover, both countries view Iran’s growing influence with concern, forming a basis for strategic convergence.
The collapse of the Assad regime in late 2024 has created a new operational and geopolitical landscape. Turkey maintains military control in northern Syria, while Israel continues to hold the Golan Heights and maintains an aerial presence throughout Syrian territory. In this context, a window emerges for pragmatic cooperation regarding Syria’s future security architecture.
In contrast to the Palestinian issue, which provokes strong ideological and social reactions, the Syrian crisis offers a less ideologically charged context in which rivalries manifest primarily through divergent strategic goals. Israel favors a weakened and fragmented Syria to curb Iranian influence, whereas Turkey supports a strong, centralized authority capable of preventing the formation of autonomous Kurdish enclaves.
Despite these differences, points of convergence exist and can be capitalized upon. Technical talks have already taken place with a mediating role, and Washington has clear reasons to encourage de-escalation between two key allies—Israel and a NATO member country. Within the broader context of role redistribution in the Middle East, the Trump administration aims to transfer security responsibilities to regional actors. Therefore, Turkish-Israeli cooperation gains additional significance for preventing conflict flare-ups and avoiding the forced re-engagement of American military forces.
At the same time, for Israel, a selective restoration of relations with Ankara may serve as a counterbalance to growing Arab cooperation initiatives, primarily led by Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates.
The geopolitical implications of a potential Turkish-Israeli rapprochement would be immediate and critical for Greece. The strategic Greek-Israeli relationship developed over the past decade—built on Israeli investment in Greek real estate, defense cooperation, energy partnerships, and coordination in the Eastern Mediterranean—would not remain the same if Israel chooses to rekindle ties with Turkey.
The Athens–Tel Aviv alignment has so far been a key tool of Greek diplomacy, both against Ankara and within the framework of European and U.S. foreign policy. The creation of an Athens–Nicosia–Cairo–Tel Aviv axis has bolstered Greece’s position as a stabilizing force. However, a Turkish-Israeli rapprochement could upend this narrative, weakening Greece’s diplomatic leverage—especially at a time when U.S. leadership appears more comfortable engaging with Recep Tayyip Erdoğan than with Kyriakos Mitsotakis.
Furthermore, it cannot be ruled out that Ankara might try to leverage a new balance with Israel to push for a redefinition of maritime zones and energy corridors in the Eastern Mediterranean—marginalizing Greece and the Republic of Cyprus.
In light of the above, Greece is called upon to adjust its regional strategy and enhance its diplomatic flexibility. The expectation of a permanent rift between Turkey and Israel is no longer a safe assumption; instead, Greece must strengthen multilateral cooperation and elevate its presence in broader geopolitical initiatives.
