Eight months ago, the Holy Synod of the Church of Greece publicly and unequivocally denied any involvement in the creation of a digital bank. After this denial, the man behind the initiative—Nikodimos Farmakis, then Director General of the Church’s Central Financial Service and now titular Bishop of Epidaurus—stepped away from the corporate structure of Financial Innovation Holding, the company that was meant to run what had been informally dubbed a “holy fintech.” Farmakis had originally launched discussions about the project with former Hellenic Postbank chairman Angelos Filippidis.
Farmakis submitted his resignation as chairman of Financial Innovation Holding on July 2. On September 24, he was replaced on the board by Filippidis, who assumed a dual role as both chairman and CEO.
The company’s board now includes Filippidis alongside Thanasis Zarkadas, Nikos Kouris, Dimitris Zervos, and Anna Iliopoulou. Despite losing Farmakis and failing to secure the official backing of the Church of Greece, Filippidis appears undeterred. This became clear when the company’s Extraordinary General Assembly on October 17, 2025, approved the issuance of one million preferred shares without voting rights. Although each share carries a nominal value of one euro, the issue price was set at thirty-five euros. Through this move, the company raised a total of thirty-five million euros. Only one million of that amount was added to the company’s share capital, the remaining thirty-four million euros were logged as a share-premium reserve.
As a result, the company’s share capital now stands at 1,149,470 euros, divided between 149,470 common shares with a nominal value of one euro and one million preferred shares with the same nominal value but issued at thirty-five euros. In practical terms, each preferred share increases paid-in capital by just one euro, while the additional thirty-four euros strengthen the company’s equity as a premium reserve—an approach commonly used by companies planning to apply for a banking license, as it boosts capital adequacy without expanding the pool of voting shareholders.
The preferred shares issued by Financial Innovation Holding carry substantial economic advantages. Should the company ever be liquidated, holders of these shares have priority over common shareholders and are entitled to receive the full amount tied to their shares, both the nominal value and the premium. Common shareholders, by contrast, would be excluded from any distribution until all obligations to preferred shareholders had been fully met.
One of the most consequential provisions approved by the Assembly, however, concerns the future of these preferred shares. They will be automatically converted into common shares if the company secures authorization to establish and operate a credit institution—either in Greece or abroad—from the Bank of Greece or another relevant regulator. The conversion will take place on a one-to-one basis, without returning the thirty-four-euro premium per share. Effectively, if the company becomes a bank, preferred shareholders will gain full voting rights while the substantial premium reserve will remain on the balance sheet as strengthened capital.
Such a conversion would drastically alter the company’s shareholder structure. The existing 149,470 common shares would represent only about thirteen percent of the total share capital, while the one million preferred shares—once converted—would account for roughly eighty-seven percent.
