Beyond the immediate impact of shareholder dilution, the move raises a more fundamental issue: the possible loss of the blocking minority that currently gives the state veto power over critical corporate decisions.
The Greek state, through the Hellenic Financial Stability Fund (HFSF) and now its successor, the Hellenic Corporation of Assets and Participations (HCAP), has invested approximately €952 million in three consecutive recapitalisations of Attica Bank, which was later merged and rebranded as CrediaBank. These investments resulted in the acquisition of about 585 million shares at an average price of roughly €1.60 per share. This figure does not include an additional €239 million cost stemming from the write-off of deferred tax credits, which has already burdened public finances. With CrediaBank’s shares currently trading below the average acquisition price, the state’s stake is already valued at less than what taxpayers have paid.
Under the scenarios being considered, a €300 million capital increase priced at around €1.20 per share would lead to the issuance of approximately 250 million new shares, pushing the total share count close to 1.87 billion. If HCAP does not participate, its ownership would fall from 36.16 percent to roughly 31.3 percent. This drop would eliminate the statutory blocking minority of 33.3 percent, fundamentally altering the state’s position within the bank and stripping it of veto rights over key matters such as amendments to the articles of association, mergers, special-terms capital increases, and limitations on minority shareholder rights.
Based on the theoretical ex-rights price of about €1.28 per share, the value of the state’s holding after the capital increase would fall to approximately €749 million, compared with an original acquisition cost of €952 million. The implied accounting loss from the equity stake alone would approach €200 million. When the previously written-off deferred tax credits are included, the total cost to the public sector rises to an estimated €440–450 million, with the risk of further deterioration if the capital increase is executed at a deeper discount or if additional capital needs emerge.
Preserving the blocking minority has therefore become a central issue. Maintaining the current 36.16 percent stake would require a pro rata investment of around €108.5 million in the new capital increase, while merely safeguarding the blocking minority threshold would require an estimated €75–80 million. Such participation would slightly reduce the average acquisition cost per share from €1.60 to around €1.57, offering only a marginal accounting improvement and leaving the overall loss largely intact.
Even if the state participates in the capital increase, the losses would not disappear. Instead, they would be spread across a larger capital base, with the accounting loss from the equity stake remaining close to €200 million, while total public exposure to the bank would exceed €1.06 billion. This reinforces concerns about the continued entrapment of public funds in a bank with a long history of repeated recapitalisations.
These developments raise pressing questions about the stance that will ultimately be taken by HCAP, the Greek Ministry of National Economy and Finance, and the Bank of Greece.
The role of the central bank is particularly sensitive. Critics argue that the Bank of Greece, acting as the supervisory authority for Attica Bank, followed an “extend and pretend” approach that ultimately increased the cost of the rescue for taxpayers. In July 2024, Bank of Greece Governor Yannis Stournaras told Parliament that the merger of Attica Bank with Pancreta Bank, combined with the entry of a private investor—forming what is now CrediaBank—represented the best possible outcome for financial stability and for taxpayers.
At the time, Mr. Stournaras maintained that the Greek state, having invested roughly €950 million over a decade, would achieve an annual return of around 4 percent, ultimately recovering between €1.2 billion and €1.6 billion and turning the investment into a net gain for taxpayers. He rejected claims that the bank was being handed over to private interests, arguing that such criticism ignored competition rules and underestimated the cost of alternative solutions. He also stressed that the private investor was participating on less favourable terms than those applied in the recapitalisations of Greece’s systemic banks.
He further warned that failure to proceed with the deal would have led to severe consequences, including deposit outflows, the collapse of both Attica Bank and Pancreta Bank, the complete loss of the state’s investment, and the activation of the deposit guarantee scheme. Such a scenario, he argued, could have resulted in haircuts on up to €1.6 billion in uninsured deposits and imposed heavy costs on the broader banking system.
Less than two years later, the reality appears to diverge sharply from those assurances. The state now holds CrediaBank shares acquired at an average price of about €1.60, while market prices remain significantly lower, locking in substantial accounting losses. A new capital increase of €300 million at a price close to €1.20 per share not only fails to support the promised 4 percent return but implies further dilution of the state’s stake and additional losses approaching €200 million from the equity investment alone. Including the deferred tax credit write-off, the total cost to taxpayers exceeds €440 million.
Equally important, the claim that the merger and recapitalisation would safeguard the state’s institutional role is being undermined in practice. Limited or zero participation by HCAP in the new capital increase would result in the loss of the blocking minority, depriving the state of meaningful veto rights despite having provided the bulk of the bank’s capital support.
Finally, the need for fresh capital only months after the merger calls into question the assertion that this solution definitively secured financial stability. Rather than closing a long chapter of bank rescues, the CrediaBank case illustrates a prolonged dependence on public funds, rising costs for taxpayers, and diminishing public control—suggesting that the confident projections presented to Parliament in the summer of 2024 have not been borne out by subsequent developments.
