The move, though long overdue, is being presented as a step toward safeguarding national security and critical infrastructure. However, its timing, scope, and surrounding political context have sparked concerns about ulterior motives—particularly in relation to high-profile foreign holdings in Greek ports.
The proposed legislation introduces a rigorous national screening mechanism for foreign investments in sectors deemed strategic or sensitive. These include energy, telecommunications, healthcare, transportation, finance, defense, media, data infrastructure, and electoral services. It also covers land and property tied to such infrastructure, extending even to undersea cables and digital networks. The declared objective is to prevent potentially harmful foreign influence over vital sectors of the Greek economy—an aim that mirrors EU-wide concerns about geopolitical dependencies.
But what distinguishes Greece’s approach is its expansive interpretation of the EU regulation. The bill proposes that an investment may be subject to scrutiny not only when it originates from a third country, but also when there is any indirect link to a third-country entity—whether through control, financing, or ownership. In effect, even investors based in EU countries can be screened if they are backed, owned, or influenced by actors from non-EU states. A stake as low as 10 percent from a third-country source in the shareholding structure of an investment entity is enough to activate the review process.
The provision goes further than the original EU regulation requires, and it does so in ways that critics warn may be open to political exploitation. The language of the draft law leaves broad room for interpretation in defining terms such as “control,” “participation,” and “financing.” This flexibility, while allowing the government to respond to a range of complex investment structures, also introduces the risk that the screening process could be wielded selectively—less as a protective shield, and more as a political lever.
This concern is compounded by the media narrative that has emerged in parallel with the bill’s submission. Around the same time the law was introduced, several Greek media outlets—especially those with close ties to the government—published reports suggesting that the United States is demanding increased oversight of Greek ports. The reports, which cite no official sources, claim that Washington is urging Athens to reassess existing port concessions, particularly those involving Chinese and Russian-linked entities.
The timing of these reports has raised eyebrows. One major target is the Piraeus Port Authority (OLP), which has been under the control of China’s COSCO since its privatization in 2016. Another is the Thessaloniki Port Authority (OLTH), which is partly owned by Greek-Russian businessman Ivan Savvidis. The suggestion that these port holdings are suddenly of urgent geopolitical concern has led some observers to question whether the new screening law is being used to engineer a shift in strategic ownership—under the pretext of national security and foreign pressure.
Adding to the skepticism is the fact that no other EU country with substantial Chinese port investments—such as France, Belgium, Germany, the Netherlands, Spain, or Italy—has cited U.S. demands or invoked similar scrutiny measures, despite having already implemented the EU’s FDI screening regulation. COSCO continues to hold assets across Europe without the same level of controversy. If U.S. officials are indeed pushing for a strategic realignment of port infrastructure, they have been unusually silent outside of Greece.
This makes the timing and messaging of the Greek initiative all the more suspect. Critics contend that the bill’s expansive powers are less about genuine security concerns and more about creating a versatile legal tool for selectively reshaping the country’s investment map to suit the political preferences of the government.
